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1 Introduction
A classical literature on the measurement of inequality claims that stochastic dominance pro-
vides a robust criterion to rank income distributions. This literature originated in papers by
Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970), and was extended by Dasgupta et al. (1973), Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1973), Saposnik (1981, 1983), and Foster and Shorrocks (1988a, 1988b) among
many.1 As summarized by Foster and Shorrocks (1988a), rst order stochastic dominance
(FSD) can be regarded as the welfare ordering that corresponds to unanimous agreement
among all monotonic utilitarian functions." As such, FSD seemingly provides a robust cri-
terion for policy evaluation because it only requires minimal knowledge of the social welfare
function. A natural prescription of this literature would be to look for policies that improve
the distribution of incomes in the FSD sense.
An important application of stochastic dominance is the one by Chu and Koo (1990)
(CK henceforth). They use FSD to evaluate the consequences of changing the reproduction
rate of a particular income group. Using a Markovian branching framework with di¤erential
fertility among income groups, they show that an exogenous reduction in the fertility of the
poor results in a sequence of income distributions that conditionally rst-degree stochastically
dominate (CFSD) the original distribution. CFSD implies FSD. CK argue that stochastic
dominance provides us with very strong theoretical support in favor of family-planning
programs that encourage the poor in developing countries to reduce their reproductive rate
(pp. 1136)." Numerical simulations of CKs model further conrm that more general fertility
reduction programs that disproportionately targets lower income groups, such as the One
Child Policy, or policies that promote fertility of high income groups, should increase social
welfare.2 These policies generally result in a sequence of income distributions that dominates
1A more complete list of references can be found in Davidson and Duclos (2000) and Atkinson and Bran-
dolini (2010). A more precise terminology is "welfare dominance" as used by Foster and Shorrocks (1988b).
We use stochastic dominance because this is the term used in the paper that is the focus of our critique.
2On policies seeking to increase the fertility of high income groups, the New York Times reports about the
Chinese policy of upgrading" the quality of their population in order to increase its international compet-
itiveness. It suggests an strategy that includes stigmatizing unmarried women older than 28, who are typi-
cally highly educated, as leftover" women. See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/global/chinas-
leftover-women.html? Last accessed 3/15/2013
2
the distribution without the program in the rst order stochastic sense.
CKs results are nevertheless puzzling. Basic economic principles suggest that absent
externalities or market failures individuals decisions should be e¢ cient. In fact, various
authors have shown that fertility choices made by altruistic parents, i.e. parents who care
about the number and welfare of their children, are socially optimal under certain conditions.
Early papers in this category include Pazner and Razin (1980), Willis (1985), Becker (1983),
Eckstein and Wolpin (1985). Recent work by Golosov et al. (2007) further shows that market
allocations are Pareto optimal in a variety of models of endogenous fertility. These ndings
suggest that family planning programs aiming at reducing the fertility of the poor do not
necessarily have the strong theoretical support claimed by CK. Lam (1993, pp 1043) expresses
similar skepticism.
Unfortunately CK do not fully spell out the decision problem of individuals, a common
feature of the literature cited in the rst paragraph. However their two main assumptions,
grounded on empirical evidence, are in fact hard to rationalize by frictionless models of
fertility. First, they assume intergenerational mobility across income and consumption groups
but complete market models, such as the Barro-Becker model, predict no mobility.3 Second,
they assume that fertility decreases with individual income, a feature that is also di¢ cult
to rationalize by e¢ cient models of fertility (see Cordoba and Ripoll, 2010). It is possible
that behind these two assumptions there are some implicit frictions explaining why fertility
is suboptimal in CKs model and intervention is welfare enhancing.
This paper revisits the question of optimality of family planning programs as envisioned by
CK but explicitly taking into consideration the household decision problem. For this purpose
we use a version of the Barro and Becker (1988, 1989) model enriched to study issues of
income distribution. Individuals in our model di¤er in their innate abilities, are altruistic
toward their descendants, and choose their own fertility optimally. Abilities are random,
determined at birth and correlated with parental abilities. Insurance markets are available
3Mobility is still hard to obtain by models of incomplete markets. For example, Alvarez (1999) nds lack
of mobility in the Barro-Becker model even in the face of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Using a non-altruistic
framework, Raut (1990) also nds that the economy reaches a steady state, with no mobility, in two periods.
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but parents cannot leave negative bequests to their children. Due to the assumed market
incompleteness, mobility arises in equilibrium and fertility di¤ers across ability groups.
The equilibrium of the model satises the two assumptions postulated by CK. First,
fertility decreases with ability in the presence of uncertainty about childrens abilities. To
the extent of our knowledge, this result is novel and of independent interest by itself. Although
there is a literature documenting and studying a negative relationship between fertility and
ability, obtaining such negative relationship within a fully dynamic altruistic model with
uncertainty is novel.4 The negative relationship arises from the interplay of two opposites
forces. On the one hand, higher ability individuals face a larger opportunity cost of having
children due to the time cost of raising children. On the other hand, higher ability individuals
enjoy a larger benet of having children when abilities are intergenerationally persistent. We
nd that the e¤ect of ability on the marginal cost dominates its e¤ect on the marginal benet
if the intergenerational persistence of abilities is not perfect. This explains why fertility
decreases with ability. Second, the equilibrium of the model exhibits mobility. In particular,
the equilibrium is characterized by a Markov branching process satisfying the Conditional
Stochastic Monotonicity property. This requirement means that if a kid from a poor family
and a kid from a rich family both fall into one of the poorest classes, it is more likely that
the poor kid will be poorer than the rich kid.
Given that the equilibrium of our model satises the assumptions postulated by CK,
direct application of their Theorem 2 implies that a reduction in the fertility of the poor
generates a sequence of income distributions that dominates the original distribution in all
periods in the rst order stochastic sense. In particular, average income and consumption
increase for all periods. This result comes from two forces. First, average ability of (born)
individuals increases because the poor have proportionally more low ability children as a
result of the assumed conditional stochastic monotonicity property. Second, consumption
and income of the poor strictly increases because they spend less time and resources raising
4See for example Becker (1960), Jones and Tertilt (2006), Kremer (1993), Hansen and Prescott (2002),
Cordoba and Ripoll (2010).
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children. However, contrary to CKs claim, we nd that individual and social welfare fall.
Our main result, Proposition 8 shows that fertility restrictions of any type, not only for the
poor, unequivocally reduce individual and social welfare in our model, in spite of the strong
degree of market incompleteness. Hence we conclude that stochastic dominance alone is not
a sound criterion to rank social welfare as claimed by Chu and Koo in particular, and by a
larger literature in general.
The primary reason why stochastic dominance fails to rank welfare properly is because
it does not take into account the fact that indirect utility functions are not invariant to the
policies in place. As we show, a policy that restricts fertility in our model reduces the set
of feasible choices and invariably reduces welfare of all individuals in all generations, even
those whose fertility is not directly a¤ected. This is because altruistic parents care not only
about their own consumption and fertility but also care about the consumption and fertility
of all their descendants. Furthermore, the welfare of those individuals who are not born
under the new policy also falls, or at least does not increase. Social welfare falls because
the welfare of all individuals, born and unborn, either falls or remain the same. This is the
case, for example, if social welfare is dened as classical (Bentham) utilitarianism, a weighted
sum of the welfare of all present and future individuals. The result also holds for versions
of classical utilitarianism that are consistent with the Barro-Becker concept of diminishing
altruism. An interpretation of our results is that the positive e¤ect on welfare of fertility
restrictions, namely higher average consumption, is dominated by the negative e¤ect of an
smaller dynasty size.
CK dene social welfare as average (Mills) utilitarianism rather than classical utilitarian-
ism. Under this denition, social welfare can increase even if the welfare of all individuals falls
if population falls even more. The net e¤ect of fertility restrictions on social welfare depends
in this case on the relative strength of two opposite forces. On the one hand, the distribution
of abilities and incomes improves for all periods, as stressed by CK. On the other hand, the
welfare of all individuals fall. Propositions 9 and 10 provide two examples in which the later
force dominates and social welfare, dened as average welfare, falls not only in present value
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but also for all periods. These are counterexamples to the claim that stochastic dominance is
a su¢ cient condition to rank social welfare, even when welfare is dened as average utilitar-
ianism. We further provide a variety of numerical simulations to illustrate that our results
are general, not just extreme examples.
Our results challenge the policy implications of CKs paper but also the broader liter-
ature, mentioned in the rst paragraph, claiming that stochastic dominance alone provide
robust normative implications. We show that carefully modeling the microfoundations of the
problem makes a di¤erence and can reverse the conclusions obtained by simple stochastic
dominance criteria. Our ndings are an application of the Lucascritique. CKs results are
based on the assumption that reduced form parameters and indirect utility functions are in-
variant to policy changes. Specically, the fertility rate as well as the indirect utility functions
of individuals are assumed to be invariant the policies in place. However these are not struc-
tural parameters but function of deeper parameters, those governing preferences, technologies
and policies in place. Policy evaluations based on the assumed constancy of the parameters
may be misleading. In his classic critique, Lucas argued that the observed negative relation-
ship between unemployment and ination cannot actually be exploited by policymakers to
systematically reduce unemployment. The analogous argument in our context is that the ob-
served negative relationship between fertility and income cannot be exploited by policymakers
to improve social welfare.
In addition to the papers already mentioned, our paper is related to Alvarez (1999). He
studies an economy with idiosyncratic shocks, incomplete markets and endogenous fertility
choices by altruistic parents. Our endowment economy is a version of his model, one with non-
negative bequest constraints. In equilibrium no individual leaves positive bequests. This is a
stronger degree of market incompleteness than that in Alvarez and it explains why mobility
arises in the equilibrium of our model but not in his. As a result, our model maps exactly into
CKs Markovian model. There is a related literature that studies fertility policies in general
equilibrium model. A recent example is Liao (2013) who studies the One Child Policy in a
model with human capital accumulation and she arrives similar conclusions. Our paper is
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complementary to hers. Our framework is simpler in that we study an endowment economy
but richer in the heterogeneity and its ability to generate mobility. This allow us to study
in detail the dynamics of the income distribution and the soundness of stochastic dominance
concepts to rank social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the basic connection
between fertility, distribution of income and social welfare in models with exogenous fertility.
The section reviews the result of CK and provides further analysis. Section 3 endogenizes
fertility and shows that fertility generally decreases with ability and income. Section 4 studies
social policies. It shows the basic limitation of CKs assumptions and argues that fertility
policies typically reduces social welfare. Numerical simulations and robustness checks are
performed in this section. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Distribution and Social Welfare with Exogenous Fertility
Consider an economy populated by a large number of individuals who live for one period.
Individuals di¤er in their labor endowments, or earning abilities. Let 
  f!1; !2; :::; !ng
be the set of possible abilities, where 0 < !1 < ::: < !n: The technology of production is
linear in ability: one unit of labor produces one unit of perishable output. In this section,
the income of an individual is equal to his/her ability. Let f (!) be the fertility rate of an
individual with ability !: It satises the following assumption.
Assumption 1. f (!i) is decreasing in ability.
2.1 Abilities
Ability is determined at birth and correlated with the ability of the parent. Ability is drawn
from the Markov chain M where Mij = Pr(!child = !ij!parent = !j) for !i and !j 2 
: As in
CK, assume that M satises the following condition:
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Assumption 2. Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity (CSM):
PI
i=1Mi1PJ
j=1Mj1

PI
i=1Mi2PJ
j=1Mj2
 ::: 
PI
i=1MinPJ
j=1Mjn
; 1  I  J  n
Assumption 2 means that if a poor kid and a rich kid both fall into one of the poorest
classes, it is more likely that the poor kid will be poorer than the rich kid. Assumption
2 assures intergenerational persistence of abilities: higher ability parents are more likely to
have higher ability children. CSM implies rst order stochastic dominance. To see this notice
that when J = n the condition becomes:
IX
i=1
Mi1 
IX
i=1
Mi2  ::: 
IX
i=1
Min, 1  I  n:
Two examples of Markov chains satisfying Assumption 2 are an i.i.d. process and quasi-
diagonal matrices of the form:
M 01 =
26666666666664
a+ b c 0 0 :: 0 0
a b c 0 :: 0 0
0 a b c :: 0 0
:: :: :: :: :: 0 0
0 0 0 0 a b c
0 0 0 0 0 a b+ c
37777777777775
:
where (a; b; c) 0; a+ b+ c = 1 and b > 0:5:
We further assume that M has a unique invariant distribution, , where  satises:
 (!j) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
:
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2.2 Fertility and the distribution of abilities
Let Pt (!) be the size of population with ability ! at time t = 0; 1; 2; :::, and Pt 
X
!2

Pt (!)
be total population at time t: The initial distribution of population, fP0 (!i)gni=1 ; is given.
Assuming that a law of large number holds, the size of population in a particular income
group evolves according to:
Pt+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

f (!i)Pt (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
: (1)
Let t (!)  Pt (!) /Pt be the fraction of population with ability ! 2 
 at time t: Since
income is equal to ability,  also characterizes the income distribution of the economy. The
law of motion of  is given by:
t+1 (!j) =
Pt
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 
 (2)
Let  (!) = lim
t!1t (!) : As shown by CK, the limit is well dened.
A central topic of the paper is to characterize t and  as well as their relationship
to fertility. The following proposition provides a simple but important benchmark. The
rst part states that when fertility is identical across types the limit distribution of incomes
is equal to ; the invariant distribution associated to M . This result provides a baseline
distribution in absence of fertility di¤erences. In that case, the distribution of income just
reects the genetic distribution of abilities, what can be termed nature rather than nurture.
The second part of the Proposition shows that fertility di¤erences alone does not necessarily
a¤ect the long-run distribution of income, . In particular, fertility di¤erences are irrelevant
for the income distribution when abilities are i.i.d. All proof are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. When  equals : Suppose one of the following two assumptions hold:
(i) f (!) = f for all ! 2 
; or (ii) M(!0; !) is independent of ! for all !0 2 
. Then
 (!) =  (!) for all ! 2 
:
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Fertility di¤erences a¤ect the distribution of incomes when abilities are persistent. The
following Proposition is an application of CKs Theorem 2. It states that if the fertility of
the poor is higher than the fertility of the rest of the population then  is di¤erent from ;
and moreover,  dominates  in the rst order stochastic sense.
Proposition 2. Suppose M satises Assumption 1 and f (!1) > f (!i) = f for all i > 1:
Then
PI
i=1 
 (!i) >
PI
i=1  (!i) for all 1  I  n:
Proof. See Chu and Koo (1990, pp.1136).
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, it follows that a reduction in the fertility of the poor
results in a limit distribution that dominates the original distribution. More generally, CK
show that if fertility decreases with income and the initial distribution of incomes is at its
steady state level, 0 (!i) ; then a reduction in the fertility of the poor results in a sequence of
income distributions that rst order stochastically dominates 0 (!i), that is,
PI
i=1 t (!i) <PI
i=1 

0 (!i) for all 1  I  n and t > 0.
2.3 Social Welfare
CK consider average utilitarian welfare functions of the form:
W (p) =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)t (!) (3)
where U(!) is the utility of an individual with ability ! and p(t) is the weight of generation
t in social welfare. A particular case emphasized by CK is one where the planner cares only
about steady state welfare: p(t) = 0 for all t and lim
t!1p(t) = 1. In that case,
W

=
X
!2

U(!) (!) (4)
The following corollary of Proposition 2 provides the theoretical support to family planning
programs for the poor, as claimed by CK.
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Corollary 3. Suppose social welfare is dened by (3) where U(!) is a non-decreasing func-
tion of ability. Furthermore, supposeM satises Assumption 2 and f (!1) > f (!i) = f
for all i > 1. Then (i) reducing the fertility of the poor increases social welfare; (ii)
fertility policies that do not change the distribution of abilities does not change social
welfare.
Corollary 3 holds because reducing fertility of the poor improves the observed distribution
of abilities but does not alter U(). In the next two sections we show counterexamples to
Corollary 3 when fertility is endogenous. As a preview of the results, we show a case in
which fertility is restricted by policy, the distribution of incomes does not change in any
period but social welfare as well as individual welfare decreases for all individuals in all
periods compared to the unrestricted case. The reason why the previous Corollary fails to
account for this possibility is that it presumes that U(!) is invariant to policies, it lacks
microfoundations. However, U(!) is in fact an indirect utility function and therefore it is not
invariant to policies.
3 An Economic Model of Fertility
We now consider the endogenous determination of fertility. Assumptions are the same as
in the previous section. In particular, the initial distribution of population across abilities,
fP0 (!i)g!i2
 ; is given, abilities are random, determined at birth and described by a Markov
chain M satisfying Assumption 1, and having a unique invariant distribution, : The tech-
nology of production is linear in labor: one unit of labor produces one unit of perishable
output. Let !t = [!0; !1; :::; !t] 2 
t+1 denote a particular realization of ability history up
to time t, for a particular family line. There is neither capital nor aggregate risk.
3.1 Individual and aggregate constraints
Markets open every period. The resources of an individual of ability !t at time t are labor
income and transfers from their parents. Labor income equals !t (1  ft) where  is the
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time cost of raising a child. Let bt (!t) denote transfers, or bequests, received from parents.
Resources are used to consume and to leave bequests to children. Insurance market exists
as parents can leave bequest contingent on the ability of their children. Let qt(!t; !t+1; ) be
price of an asset that delivers one unit of consumption to a child of ability !t+1 given that
the history up to time t is !t.5 The budget constraint of an individual at time t with history
!t is:
ct
 
!t

+ ft
 
!t
 nX
i=1
qt(!
t; !i)bt+1
 
!t; !i
  !t  1  ft  !t+ bt  !t : (5)
We assume that parents cannot leave negative bequests to their children:
bt+1
 
!t; !i
  0 for all !t 2 
t+1; !i 2 
 and all t > 0:
Furthermore, suppose b0 (!i) = 0 for all !i 2 
:
Since output is perishable, aggregate consumption must be equal to aggregate production.
Alternatively, aggregate savings must be zero. Savings are equal to the total amount of
bequests left by parents. Since bequests are non-negative then aggregate savings are zero if
and only if all bequests are zero. Therefore, in any equilibrium the budget constraints (5)
simplies to:
ct
 
!t
  !t  1  ft  !t for all !t 2 
t+1 and all t  0. (6)
This is balanced budget constraint for every period and state. The lack of intergenerational
transfers signicantly simplies the problem and explain why social mobility arises in the
equilibrium. Otherwise, as shown by Alvarez (1999), parents will use family size to bu¤er
against shocks and use transfers to smooth consumption across time and states regardless
of ability preventing thus any social mobility. Absent transfers, ability becomes the key
determinant of consumption and fertility, as we see below.
In addition to budget constraints, individuals must satisfy time constraints. In particular,
the time spent in raising children cannot exceed the time available to an individual, which is
5The price also depends on the aggregate distribution of abilities at time t.
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normalized to 1. Thus,
0  ft
 
!t
  1

: (7)
3.2 Individuals Problem
The lifetime utility of an individual born at time t is of the Barro-Becker type (Barro and
Becker 1989 and Becker and Barro 1988):
Ut = u (ct) + f
1 
t EtUt+1, t = 0; 1; 2; :::: (8)
where u (c) = c

 ;  2 (0; 1) ; is the utility from consumption, ft is the number of children, Ut+1
is the utility of the time t + 1 generation, and Et is the mathematical expectation operator
conditional on the information up to time t. The term f1 t is the weight that parents place
on their ft children. When  = 0 parents are perfectly altruistic toward children. We assume
0   < 1:
The following restrictions on parameters are needed in order to have a well-behaved
bounded problem.
Assumption 3. 1   >  and 1  > :
The rst part of the assumption is identical to the one discussed by Barro and Becker
(1988) to assure strict concavity of the problem. The second part guarantees bounded utility
as the e¤ective discount factor in that case satises f1 t   1 < 1:6
The individuals problem is to choose a sequence

ft
 
!t
	1
t=0
to maximize U0 subject
to (6) and (7). The problem can be written in sequence form, by recursively using (8), to
obtain:
U0 (!0) = maxfPt+1(!t 1;!t)g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tPt
 
!t 1
1 "
u
 
!t
 
1  Pt+1
 
!t 1; !t

Pt (!t 1)
!!
(9)
6An upper bound for Ut is
u(!n)
1  1 :
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subject to
0  Pt+1
 
!t 1; !t
  Pt  !t 1 = for all !t 1 2 
t, !t 2 
 and t  0; P0 > 0:
In this formulation, P0
 
! 1

= 1. Pt+1
 
!t

=
tQ
j=0
fj
 
!j

. Fertility rates can be recovered
as ft
 
!t

=
Pt+1(!t 1;!t)
Pt(!t 1) :
An alternative way to describe the household problem is by the following functional
equation:
U (!) = max
f2[0; 1

]
u (! (1  f)) + f1 E U  !0 j! (10)
The next proposition states that the principle of optimality holds for this problem. This
result is novel because the functional equation is not standard due to the endogeneity of
fertility. In particular the discount factor is endogenous. Alvarez (1999) shows that the
principle of optimality holds for a dynastic version of this problem, while we show that it
holds for the household version of the problem.7 Our household problem is simpler because
of the lack of intergenerational transfers in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The functional equation (10) has a unique solution, U (!). Moreover U (!) =
U0 (!) for ! 2 
:
7The analogous dynastic problem is:
V (N;!) = max
N02[0; 1

N ]
u
 
!   N 0=NN1  + E U  N 0; !0 j! :
In this problem the number of family members is a state variable, N , all member have the same ability, !;
and make the same choices. The household problem does not impose these constraints.
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3.3 Optimal Fertility
The optimality condition for an interior fertility choice is:8
!u0 ((1  f)!) =  (1  ) f E U  !0 j! (11)
Let f = f(!) be the optimal fertility rule and c = c (!)  (1  f(!))! the optimal
consumption rule. The left hand side of this expression is the marginal cost of a child while
the right hand side is the marginal benet. The marginal cost is the product of the cost per
child, !, times the marginal utility of consumption: The marginal benet to the parent is
the expected welfare of a child, E [U (!0) j!], times the parental weight associated to the last
child,  (1  ) f(!) . According to (11), both the marginal cost and the marginal benet of
children are increasing functions of ability, !. The marginal cost increases with ! because it
increases the opportunity cost of the parental time required to raise children. The marginal
benet increases because of the postulated intergenerational persistence of abilities: high
ability parents are more likely to have high ability children.
It is instructive to write the rst order condition in an alternative way. First, use equation
(11) to express (10) as:
Ut = u (c (!)) +
1
1  f (!)!u
0 (c (!)) (12)
Then use (12) to rewrite (11) as:
u0 (c (!)) (f (!)) = E

u0
 
c
 
!0
 !0
!

1

+
1    


1

  f  !0! : (13)
This equation is useful because it only requires marginal utilities, rather than total utility as
in equation (11), and corresponds to the Euler Equation of the problem describing the optimal
8Corner solutions are not optimal due to the properties of utility functions and altruistic function. Having
no children is never optimal because the marginal benet of a child is innite while the marginal cost is nite.
In particular, notice that E [U (!0) j!] > 0 for all ! while limf!0 f  = 1: Having the maximum number of
children is also sub-optimal because the marginal cost is innite when parental consumption is zero.
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consumption rule. Although savings are zero in equilibrium, fertility allows individuals to
smooth consumption across generations.9
To better understand the implications of the model it is useful to consider some specic
cases. The following Proposition consider three cases: i.i.d abilities across generations, perfect
intergenerational persistence of abilities with no uncertainty and random walk (log) abilities10
Proposition 5. Persistence and the fertility-ability relationship. (i) Fertility de-
creases with ability if abilities are i.i.d across generations. In this case f (!) satises
the equation f(!)

(1 f(!))1  = A!
  where A is a constant. Furthermore, fertility is
independent of ability in one of the following two cases: (ii) M is the identity matrix
(abilities are perfectly persistent and deterministic); or (iii) ln!t = ln!t 1 + "t where
"t  N(0; 2).
According to Proposition 5, fertility decreases with ability when abilities are i.i.d. The
intuition is that without intergenerational persistence, the ability of the parent only a¤ects
her/his marginal cost but not her/his marginal benet as E [U (!0) j!] = E [U (!0)] for all
! 2 
: On the other extreme, fertility is independent of ability when abilities are perfectly
persistent across generations (cases ii and iii). This is because in those cases both the marginal
cost and the marginal benet are proportional to !.
Given that fertility becomes only independent of ability in the extreme case of perfect
persistent, it is natural to conjecture that fertility decreases with ability when persistence is
less than perfect. We were able to conrm this conjecture numerically but analytical solutions
were not obtained.
9Equation (11) can also be written in the form of a more traditional Euler Equation. Let 1 + r0 be the
gross return of "investing" in a child. It is given by 1 + r0  U(!0)=u0(c0)
!
. In this expression, U(!0)=u0(c0) is
the value of a new life, in terms of goods, while ! is the cost of creating a new individual. Then (11) can be
written as:
u0(c) =  (1  ) f E u0(c0)  1 + r0 j! : (14)
This is an Euler Equation with a discount factor  (1  ) f : It suggests that optimal fertility choices are
similar to saving decisions and that children are like an asset, as pointed out by Alvarez (1999). However, two
important di¤erences with the traditional Euler Equation are that the individual controls both the discount
factor and the gross return.
10Although a random walk does not satisfy some of the assumptions above, it helps to develop some intuition.
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3.4 Dynamics of the Income Distribution
Given the optimal fertility rule f (), initial distribution 0 () of population across abili-
ties, and initial population P0, distributions of income for all periods can be obtained using
equations (1) and (2). Furthermore, average earning abilities and average income are given
by:
Et =
X
!2

!t (!) ; It =
X
!2

! (1  f (!))t (!)
In the next section we use the microfounded model to perform welfare evaluations of family
planing programs. The model also allows us to assess whether Assumption 1 and Assumption
2 are somewhat associated. They are. A mobility matrix with less than perfect persistence of
intergenerational abilities can give rise to a negative relationship between fertility and ability.
The following Proposition revisits Proposition 1 at the light of the micro-founded model. It
plays an important role in section 4 when providing counter-examples to CKs claims.
Proposition 6. Persistence, fertility and ability distribution. (i) If M(; !) is inde-
pendent of ! then f (!) decreases with ! and  (!) =  (!) for ! 2 
; (ii) if M is the
identity matrix then f (!) = f for all ! 2 
 and t (!) =  (!) = 0 (!) for all ! 2 

and all t; (iii) if ln! follows a Gaussian random walk then f (!) = f; and given !0 the
variance of abilities diverges to 1.
In words, if abilities are i.i.d. across generations, then fertility decreases with ability
but the observed limit distribution of abilities is independent of fertility choices and equal
to  (!). Furthermore, with certainty and perfect intergenerational persistence of abilities
the observed distribution of abilities in any period is identical to the initial distribution of
abilities. Finally, if (log) abilities follow a random walk then there is not limit distribution
of abilities since its variance goes to innite.
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3.5 Fertility Policies and Individual Welfare
Consider now a family planning policy that sets lower and/or upper bounds on fertility
choices. Let f(!)  0 and f(!)  1= be the lower and upper bound respectively. Bounds
potentially depend on individual abilities. The indirect utility U r (!) of the constrained
problem is described by the following Bellman equation:
U r (!) = max
f2[f(!);f(!)]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U r  !0 j! : (15)
Let f r (!) denotes the optimal fertility rule. The following Proposition is one of the main
results of the paper. It states that binding fertility restrictions in at least one state reduces
the indirect utility, or welfare, of all individuals even those whose fertility is not directly
a¤ected. The Proposition also states that fertility restrictions of any type (weakly) reduces
the fertility of all individuals except perhaps those whose fertility rates are at or below the
lower bound.
Proposition 7. U r (!)  U(!) with strict inequality if f(!) > f(!) or f(!) < f(!) for at
least one !: Furthermore, f r(!) = f(!) if f(!)  f(!) and f r(!)  f(!) otherwise.
Fertility restrictions reduce welfare because it restricts individualschoices without pro-
viding any compensation. Furthermore, fertility restrictions that only a¤ects a particular
group, say the lowest ability individuals, results in lower welfare for all individuals because,
regardless of current ability, there is a positive probability that a descendant of the dynasty
will fall into the group directly a¤ected in nite time. Proposition 7 implies that policies
such as the One Child Policy, which imposes a uniform bound on all ability levels, or policies
that compel individuals to increase their fertility, such as the "leftover" women stigma in
China, are detrimental to individual welfare, according to our model. Given that welfare of
all individuals falls, the marginal benets of having children also falls while the marginal cost
remains the same. As a result, fertility must fall for all types except perhaps for those who
are constrained by the policy to increase their fertility. We next study the consequences of
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fertility restrictions on social welfare.
4 Family Planning and Social Welfare Reconsidered
Given that fertility policies reduces the welfare of all individuals, as stated in Proposition
7, it is natural to infer that social welfare should also fall. The answer, however, depends
on how social welfare is dened and whether the policy reduces or increases population. In
this section we focus on fertility policies that impose upper limits on fertility rates such as
limiting the fertility of the poor or the One Child Policy.
4.1 Analytical results
According to Proposition 7, upper limits on the fertility of any ability group reduces fertility
of all ability groups. Therefore, upper limits on fertility unequivocally reduces population of
all ability groups at all times after time 0. Given that both population and individual welfare
fall for all ability types, we are able to show that fertility limits unequivocally decrease
social welfare if social welfare is of the classical, or Bentham, utilitarian form. Classical
utilitarianism denes social welfare as the total discounted welfare of all (born) individuals:11
W =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)Pt (!) : (16)
In this formulation p(t)  0 is the weight the social planner assigns to generation t. Since
individuals are altruistic toward their descendants, p(t) > 0 means that the planner gives
additional weight to generation t on top of what is implied by parental altruism. A particular
case in which the planner weights only the original generation, and therefore adopts its
altruistic weights, is the one with p(0) = 1 and p(t) = 0 for t > 0 :
W0 =
X
!2

U(!)P0 (!) (17)
11The results are similar if the welfare of the unborn is explicitly considered as long as the unborn enjoy
lower utility than the born.
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The following Proposition states the main conclusion of the paper: restricting fertility de-
creases classical utilitarian welfare.
Proposition 8. Imposing upper limits on fertility choices reduces social welfare as dened
by (16).
An identical result is obtained if the planner exhibits positive but diminishing returns to
population, say if Pt (!) in expression (16) is replaced by Pt (!)
1 p where p 2 (0; 1) : This
formulation seems the natural extension of the Barro-Becker preferences for a planer.
An alternative denition of social welfare is average, or Mills, utilitarianism as dened by
equation (3) for the general case, and with (4) as a special case. This denition of welfare,
the one used by CK, is analogous to (16) but uses population shares, t (!), rather than
population, Pt (!). Under this denition, social welfare could increase even if the welfare of
all individuals fall. The net e¤ect depends on the relative strength of two potentially opposite
forces: on the one hand individual welfare falls but on the other hand the distribution of
abilities, , may improve, as in CK. We next show analytical examples in which social welfare
falls even under this denition. These are analytical formal counterexamples to CKs claims
that fertility limits on the poor are welfare enhancing.
The following Proposition states that fertility restrictions of any type reduce average
utilitarian welfare if abilities are i.i.d.
Proposition 9. Suppose M(; !) is independent of ! for all ! 2 
 and 0 (!i) =  (!i).
Then upper limits on fertility choices reduce social welfare as dened by (3).
Proposition 9 relies on the earlier nding in Proposition 1 that, when abilities are i.i.d,
the distribution of abilities among the population is independent of fertility choices and the
limit distribution of ability is the invariant distribution of M . We show in the appendix
that t (!i) =  (!i) for all t if 0 (!i) =  (!i) : Therefore, in the i.i.d case the e¤ect of
any fertility policy on social welfare, as dened by (3), is only determined by its e¤ect on
individual welfare, U .
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A particular implication of Proposition 9 is that limiting the fertility of the poor reduces
welfare which contradicts CKs claim stated in Corollary 3. The i.i.d case in Proposition 9
satises CKs Assumptions 1 and 2 since fertility rates are decreasing, as stated in Proposition
5, and i.i.d abilities satises conditional stochastic monotonicity. Corollary 3 fails to properly
describe the e¤ect of the policy on social welfare because it implicitly assumes that U is
una¤ected by the policy change.
The following is a deterministic example showing that average utilitarian welfare unequiv-
ocally falls with uniform" fertility restrictions such as the one child policy.
Proposition 10. SupposeM is the identity matrix and f (!) = f . Then fertility restrictions
reduces social welfare as dened by (3).
Proposition 10 provides another example in which fertility restriction do not a¤ect :
Since in the deterministic case all ability groups have the same fertility choices, and the
fertility restriction a¤ect all ability groups equally, then it follows that t = 0 for all t so
that the e¤ect of the policy on social welfare is only determined by the e¤ect on individual
welfare U .
We now turn to numerical simulations to investigate more generally the e¤ects of fertility
policies on social welfare.
4.2 Calibration and Simulations
4.2.1 Benchmark calibration
The following parameters are needed to simulate the model: the Markov process of abilities
M , preference parameter ; altruistic parameters  and , cost of raising children ; and
social planner weight p (t) :
Income groups, fertilities of di¤erent income groups, and the Markov chain are taken
from Lam (1986) who provides estimates for Brazil. Average incomes for ve income groups
are
 !
I = [553; 968; 1640; 2945; 10991] : They describe income classes of Brazilian male house-
hold heads aged from 40 to 45 in 1976. Average fertility of each income group are
 !
f =
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[6:189; 5:647; 5:065; 4:441; 3:449] =2:We divide fertility by two to obtain fertility per-adult. Us-
ing income and fertility data, we calculate earning abilities of di¤erent groups as !i =
I(!i)
1 f(!i)
and normalize the lowest ability to be 1. The Markov chain provided by Lam is:
M =
26666666664
0.50 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.05
0.25 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.10
0.15 0.20 0.35 0.20 0.20
0.05 0.10 0.20 0.35 0.25
0.05 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.40
37777777775
This chain does not satisfy conditional stochastic monotonicity property although its diagonal
elements dominate other elements implying certain level of earning persistency across gener-
ations. We also consider the Markov chain provided by CK, which satises CSM, and obtain
similar results. Initial population is normalized to 1. The initial distribution of abilities, 0;
is approximated by the stationary distribution implied by M and
 !
f .
Our altruistic function, f1 , is calibrated following Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) (MS
henceforth).12 For  we initially used MSs parameter of 0:38. However, the fertility rates
implied by the calibrated model were too high and the range of fertilities too small compared
to Brazilian fertility data. We set  = 0:68 to better t the fertility data. Another key
parameter of the model is the time cost of raising a child, . We choose  = 0:2 which
implies a maximum number of 10 children per couple, or that each parent spend 10% of their
time on every child. We perform robustness checks for this and other parameters. For the
social planner weights we assume p (t) = t with  = 0:1: The set of parameters used for the
benchmark exercises are summarized in Table 1.
12Their altruistic function takes the form e Be 0+1 ln f where B = 25 is the age of fertility. So the
proper mapping is =e Be 0 and 1   = 1.
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Table 1. Parameters Setting
Parameters Concept Values
 individual discount factor 0.29
 elasticity of substitution 0.68
 altruistic parameter 0.35
 per child time cost 0.2
 weight of social planner 0.1
4.2.2 Results
The simulated model reproduces a negative relationship between fertility and ability similar
to the Brazilian data.13 Because abilities are persistent but not perfectly persistent across
generations, the increase of the marginal cost of children dominates that of the marginal
benet as ability increases. As shown in the rst panel of Figure 1, fertility per household
falls from 9 to 2 as earning abilities increase from 1 to 12. The second panel plots average
ability, !; and average income; y; as the upper bound of fertility increases. As predicted by
CK, tighter fertility limits, which a¤ect lower income groups more severely, increase average
income and ability.
The remaining panels in Figure 1 illustrate the e¤ect of fertility limits on various welfare
measures. On the horizontal axis is the uniform fertility upper limit imposed on all ability
groups, a limit that goes from 0 to 10 children per household. It shows that steady state aver-
age welfare, W

, average welfare of all generations, W (p), welfare of the initial generation,
W0; and total welfare of all generations, W (p) ; all increase as the upper bound on fertility
is relaxed. These results conrm the main message of the paper: fertility restrictions, on the
poor or other groups, do not have strong theoretical support for improving peoples welfare.
We also study the welfare e¤ects of imposing lower bounds on fertility rates. This type
of restrictions disproportionately a¤ect the rich, or high ability individuals, because their
unconstrained fertility is typically lower. Figure 2 shows that this policy increases average
ability since high ability individuals have proportionally more high ability children. On the
other hand, the policy reduces average income because individuals, especially those with high
13By construction, our calibration targets the dispersion of fertilities but not the sign of the relationship
between fertility and income.
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ability, spend more time raising children and this e¤ect dominates the e¤ect of an improved
ability distribution. All four welfare measures unanimously decrease as the lower bound on
fertility increases.
In summary, the results above show that fertility restrictions, on the poor and on the
rich, does not result into higher social welfare although they may improve the distribution of
abilities and income.
4.2.3 Robustness Checks
We now report the results of various robustness checks. For this purpose we change one
parameter at a time while keeping all the other parameters at their benchmark values and
study the e¤ect on the various welfare measures of imposing an upper limit on fertility. We
nd that the qualitative results obtained above are mostly robust although there exists a set
of parameters for which average steady state welfare, W

; improves with fertility restrictions.
The set of parameters studied is further restricted by the need to have nite utility.
The results are robust to setting  below 0:74. If  is larger than 0.74, relaxing fertility
restrictions slightly reduce steady state average welfare, W

; but only when there is a tight
upper limit on fertility, of between 1 and 2, as illustrated in the rst panel of Figure 3 for
 = 0:9: A high elasticity of intergenerational substitution signicantly reduces the gains
of smoothing consumption through fertility choices. In addition, low fertility allows higher
consumption and low marginal utility of consumption. As a result, a relaxation of fertility
restrictions have a minor impact on individual utility and the change in the distribution of
abilities determines the change in social welfare. However, further relaxation of the upper
limit increases W

.
We also nd that if  is su¢ ciently low, a tighter fertility restriction may increase W

as illustrated in the second panel of Figure 3 for the case  = 0:2. A low  means that
parents care little about future generations, have fewer kids, higher consumption and lower
marginal utility of consumption. In this case, fertility restrictions have a minor e¤ect on
individual welfare and, as a result, the change of the ability distribution is the dominant
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e¤ect determining social welfare. However, this low degree of altruism also implies that the
model predicts counterfactually low fertility rates. A similar result is obtained when  is
particularly large, as illustrated in the third panel of Figure 3 for  = 0:53.
Finally, if the cost of raising children, ; is su¢ ciently large then a tighter fertility restric-
tion may increase W

as shown in the last panel of Figure 3 for the case  = 0:28. In this
case the high cost of raising children itself prevents households from having many children
and therefore fertility restrictions are not very harmful for individual welfare. The change in
social welfare is therefore primarily determined by the change in the distribution of abilities.
5 Conclusion
Stochastic dominance, or welfare dominance, seemingly provides a robust criterion for policy
evaluation. It allows to rank policies by simply looking at the resulting income distribution
without requiring much knowledge of individualspreferences and constraints, or knowledge
of the social welfare function. Cho and Koo (1990) exploit such apparent generality to provide
a striking policy recommendation. They assert that stochastic dominance provides us with
very strong theoretical support in favor of family-planning programs that encourage the poor
in developing countries to reduce their reproductive rate (pp 1136)." Such fundamental claim
has surprisingly remained unchallenged. In this paper we show that stochastic dominance
alone does not provide the strong theoretical support claimed by CK. Our ndings challenges
not only CKs main normative conclusion but also the larger classical literature on the topic
of welfare dominance which is the foundation of such conclusion.
Our main contribution is to provide explicit micro-foundations to CKs model. The key
features are altruism, random abilities, labor costs of raising children, non-negative bequest
constraints, and an endowment economy. The model is particularly useful because its equilib-
rium exactly maps into the Markov branching framework of CK. It also successfully replicates
two basic features of the evidence on fertility and income distribution: fertility decreases with
ability and social mobility occurs in equilibrium. These features are not easily obtained by
25
altruistic models of fertility.
We show that fertility restrictions reduces social welfare in our model in spite of the
fact that they may result in superior income distributions in the rst order stochastic sense.
Contrary to CK, and to a larger literature mentioned in the introduction, we nd that rst
order stochastic dominance does not provide a strong theoretical support to family-planning
programs directed toward reducing the fertility of the poor. The main reason for this failure
is that stochastic dominance does not account for the fact that indirect utility functions are
not invariant to fertility policies.
Our model abstracts from a number of aspects that are potentially important to fertility
decisions such as bequests, human capital accumulation, and wealth inequality. We study
these extensions in Cordoba el al. (2013). The models are signicantly more complicated,
and do not map into a simple Markov branching framework, but our early results conrm
the ndings that policies restricting fertility typically does not increase social welfare.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) If fertility is exogenously the same for every individual, divide
both sides of (1) by Pt+1.
Pt+1 (!j)
Pt+1
=
Pt
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)
Pt (!i)
Pt
M(!j ; !i) for all !j 2 

Using the denition of t,
t+1 (!j) =
Pt
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
=
fPt
Pt+1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
The last equality holds because
Pt+1 = Pt
X
!i2

ft (!i) = Ptf
Taking limit to both sides of the expression with , we get
 (!j) = lim
t!1t+1 (!j) = limt!1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i)
Hence  () =  () is the invariant distribution of M:
Proof of Proposition 1 (ii) M( ; !i) is independent of !i implies M(!j ; !i) =M(!j) for
every !j 2 
: By (1),
t+1 (!j) =
M(!j)
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)t (!i)Pt
=M(!j) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j)
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Taking limit to both sides,  () = lim
t!1t () is equal to the invariant distribution.
Proof of Proposition 4 We rst show that there exists a solution U () that solves the
functional equation (10). Dene a set of functions.
S = ff : 
! Rj kfk Mg
whereM = u(!n)
1  1 , and k  k is the sup norm. We can show that S is a complete metric
space. Dene operator T as
TU (!) = max
0 f  1

u ((1  f)!) + f1 "E U  !0 j! (18)
for all ! 2 
 and U 2 S. First show that T is a contraction. It su¢ ces to show
that T satises two properties, monotonicity and discounting. Suppose the sequential
problem has a unique solution, then the right hand side of (18) has a solution. Standard
argument can show that for any U and ~U 2 S satisfying U (!)  ~U (!) for all !, then
TU (!)  T ~U (!) for all !. The following arguments show discounting property holds.
For any given constant b,
T (U (!) + b) = max
0 f  1

u ((1  f)!) + f1 "E U  !0+ bj!
= max
0 f  1

u ((1  f)!) + f1 "E U  !0 j!+ bf1 "
 max
0 f  1

u ((1  f)!) + f1 "E U  !0 j!+ b 1

1 "
= TU (!) +  1b
By Contraction Mapping Theorem, there exists a unique xed point U : 
 ! R that
solves the functional equation TU = U . The functional equation has a unique solution.
The existence of a solution U () has been proved, we next show U (!) = U0 (!) for all
! 2 
: Pt+1  !t	1t=0 are the choice variables in the sequential problem (9). Since the
31
current population Pt
 
!t 1

is given, the problem is the same if we choose

ft
 
!t
	1
t=0
instead of

Pt+1
 
!t
	1
t=0
, and it can be written as follows. Given !i, the welfare of an
individual in generation i is
Ui (!i) = maxfft(!t)g1t=0
E0
1X
t=i
t i
t 1Y
j=i
fj
 
!j
1 
u
 
!t
 
1  ft
 
!t

subject to 0  ft
 
!t
  1 . Since at optimal there is no intergenerational transfer
of wealth from parents to children, the welfare functions of every individual in all
generations are the same, i.e. Ui () = U () for all !i. Next we show U (!0) satises
the functional equation (10).
U (!0) > u (!0 (1  f0)) + f1 0 E0
1X
t=1
t 1
t 1Y
j=1
fj
 
!j
1 
u
 
!t
 
1  ft
 
!t

= u (!0 (1  f0)) + f1 0 E0 [U (!1) j!0]
for any given f0 if
n
fj
 
!j
o1
j=1
is the optimal solution that attains U (!1), the welfare
of an individual living in generation 1 with ability !1. There exists a feasible plan that
attains U (!0), so
U (!0) = max
f02[0; 1 ]
u (!0 (1  f0)) + f1 0 E0 [U (!1) j!0]
Hence U () satisfy the functional equation (10). Then we show that U (!) is the
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maximum of the sequential problem for any given !.
U (!0) = max
f2[0; 1

]
u (!0 (1  f)) + f1 E0 [U (!1) j!0]
> u (!0 (1  f0 (!0))) + E0
0@ f0 (!0)1  u  !1  1  f1  !1
+2f0 (!0)
1 E0f1
 
!1
1 
E [U (!2) j!1]
1A
>   
> E0
TX
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
u
 
!t
 
1  ft
 
!t

+ T+1E0
TY
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
U (!T+1)
for all feasible plan

ft
 
!t
	1
t=0
:
T+1
TY
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
U (!T+1)  T+1

1

(1 )(T+1) u (!max)
1  " 1
lim
T!1
T+1

1

(1 )(T+1)
= 0
Since there exists a feasible plan that attains U (!0),
U (!0) = max
fft(!t)g1t=02[0; 1 ]
E0
1X
t=0
t
t 1Y
j=0
fj
 
!j
1 
u
 
!t
 
1  ft
 
!t

Therefore,
U (!0) = U
 (!0)
Proof of Proposition 5 (i) In this case, Equation (11) can be written as f(!)

(1 f(!))1  =
A!  where A is a constant. Using the implicit function theorem, it follows that
f 0 =   =!

f(!)
+
(1 )
1 f(!)
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 5 (ii) In deterministic case, !t+1 = !t; ct+1 (!t+1) = ct (!t) for all
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!t 2 
 and equation (13) simplies to:
f = 

1

+
1    


1

  f

(19)
The left hand side of equation (19) is strictly increasing in f while the right hand side
is strictly decreasing in f. Obviously f > 0. An interior solution with f < 1= exists
since 1  > .
Proof of Proposition 5 (iii) Let f denotes the optimal fertility given !. Plug functional
form of u () into equation (12)
U (!) = h (f)! (20)
where
h (f)  1

(1  f) + 1
1  f
 (1  f) 1 (21)
We make a guess on the value function and let it take the form: U (!) = A! where A
is a constant, independent of !: Equating this guess with (20) results in:
A = h (f) (22)
Thus, in order for A to be independent of !; we must verify that the results f is
independent of !: Notice that,
E

U
 
!0
 j! = E A!0j! = A!e222
The last equality holds because the assumption that !0 is lognormal distributed with
ln! and " as the mean and variance of ln!0: Plug this equality into (11) to obtain:
 (1  f) 1 ! = A (1  ) f e
22
2 !
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! cancels out of this equation and therefore f is independent of ! conrming our guess.
This expression together with (21) and (22) gives a rule to solve the optimal fertility
f.
 (1  f) 1
 (1  ) f  e
 
22
2 = (1  f) + f

1   (1  f
) 1
To see that this equation has a solution, divide both sides by (1  f) 1 to obtain
f
 (1  )

e 
22
2   f1 

= 1  f
Proof of Proposition 6 Part (i) directly applies Proposition 1 and Proposition 5 (i). To
prove part (ii), we can apply Proposition 5 (ii), in which fertility is independent of
ability when M is identity. We use this result to prove the distribution of every period
as well as the limit distribution is the same with the initial one.
t+1 (!j) =
Pt
Pt+1
X
!i2

f (!i)t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
=
Ptf
Pt+1
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
=
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i) = t (!j)
The last equality holds because M is an identity matrix. So t (!) = 0 (!) for all
! and all t: By taking limit we have  (!) = 0 (!). Part (iii) follows Proposition 5
(iii). The conditional variance of ln!t diverges to innite because ln!t = ln!0+
t 1P
i=0
i;
E (ln!tj!0) = ln!0; V ar (ln!tj!0) = t22 and limt!1 V ar (ln!tj!0) =1:
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Proof of Proposition 7. Notice that
U (!) = max
ft2[0;1=]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U  !0 j!
 max
[f(!);f(!)]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U  !0 j! := U1  !0
 max
[f(!);f(!)]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U1  !0 j! := U2  !0
::
 max
[f(!);f(!)]
u ((1  f)!) + f1 E U r  !0 j! = U r  !0
where the rst inequality is strict if a constraint is binding for any particular !; the
remaining inequalities follow from the contraction mapping recursion, and the nal
inequality uses the contraction mapping theorem. Furthermore, a strict inequality
for a particular ! translates into a strict inequality for all !0s since M is a regular
Markov chain meaning that, regardless of initial ability there is positive probability
that someone in the dynasty will reach a binding state in nite time. The second part
of the proposition follows because fertility restrictions do not change the marginal costs
of having children but it decreases the marginal benets by reducing U (!) for all !
(see equation (11)). Hence an upper bound of fertility makes people have fewer children
than (or the same number of children with) the unrestricted case.
Proof of Proposition 8 By (1) and Proposition 7,
P1 (!j) =
X
!i2

f (!i)P0 (!i)M(!j ; !i)

X
!i2

f r (!i)P
r
0 (!i)M(!j ; !i) = P
r
1 (!j)
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where P0 (!i) = P r0 (!i). An inductive argument guarantees
Pt+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

f (!i)Pt (!i)M(!j ; !i) 
X
!i2

f r (!i)P
r
t (!i)M(!j ; !i) = P
r
t+1 (!j)
for all !j and all nite t  0.
W r (p) =
1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U
r(!)P rt (!)

1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)P
r
t (!)

1X
t=0
X
!2

p(t)U(!)Pt (!) =W (p)
Proof of Proposition 9 By the proof of Proposition 1(ii),
t+1 (!j) =
X
!i2

t (!i)M(!j ; !i)
If 0 (!i) =  (!i), then
1 (!j) =
X
!i2

 (!i)M(!j ; !i) =  (!j) ;
and by iteration, t (!) =  (!)for all t and all !. So restriction on fertility upper
bound only reduces individual utility by Proposition 8 but does not a¤ect the ability
distribution. It decreases social welfare dened by (3).
Proof of Proposition 10 This Proposition relies on Proposition 7 (ii)s results in t (!) =
 (!) = 0 (!) when M is an identity. Similar with Proposition 10, restriction does
not alter distribution, which together with Proposition 8, nishes the proof.
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